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Introduction
Nationwide class actions have played a significant role in the U.S.
legal system.1 When a company participates in misconduct that affects
a large group of people, the class action is one of the best vehicles for
vindicating that group’s rights.2 Due to recent developments in
personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence, the class-action device is being
threatened with a blow that would severely limit its application. To
best understand, consider the following hypothetical: Hurricane Katrina
decimated much of the lower eastern quarter of the United States.
Massive rebuilding efforts—and the Florida housing bubble—caused
drywall to be in short supply.3 To fix the shortage, drywall from China
was imported to the U.S. and used in homes throughout the coastal
states.4 Not long after installation, the drywall began to give off
unpleasant odors, corrode wiring, and cause homeowners to feel
physically ill.5 Imagine a Florida resident has been adversely affected
by the use of the drywall in her home. Meanwhile, a class action based
on the same grievances as our Florida resident is filed in a Louisiana
federal court and passes the certification process. Assume the Florida
resident is one of several thousand unnamed plaintiffs in the class action
from out of state. The defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).6 After
Bristol-Myer Squibb Co. v. Superior Court7 (“BMS”)—holding that a
California court lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state-plaintiff
claims in a mass-tort action—should the federal court grant the motion
to dismiss?
In her dissenting opinion in BMS, Justice Sotomayor made clear
that the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether its ruling
applied to class actions.8 And after BMS, federal courts are split on the
issue. Out of 104 cases, fifty federal courts have held that BMS extends
1.

Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Did Bristol-Myers Squibb Kill the Nationwide Class
Action?, 129 Yale L.J.F. 205, 206 (2019).

2.

Id.

3.

Contaminated Drywall: Examining the Current Health, Housing and
Product Safety Issues Facing Homeowners: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci.,
and Transp., 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Sen. Roger F. Wicker).

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

See, e.g., In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 092047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *1–3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). Facts proposed
in the hypothetical are loosely based on the facts of this case.

7.

137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).

8.

Id. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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to class actions, forty did not reach a holding, and fourteen held that
BMS does not extend to class actions.9 Some have argued that the
question is not whether BMS applies to class actions but rather how it
applies.10 Rather than examining each and every context in which a
class action may arise in federal court and altering the analysis
accordingly, this Note endorses a simpler resolution to the problem:
BMS does not apply to unnamed plaintiffs in class actions in federal
court because absent class members are not parties to the lawsuit for
personal-jurisdiction purposes.11
The non-party approach was previously affirmed by the Supreme
Court with regard to subject matter jurisdiction in class actions, and
the rationale the Court applied for doing so applies equally in the
personal-jurisdiction context.12 Moreover, the non-party approach to
personal jurisdiction in class actions has been adopted by several federal
district courts as well as a federal court of appeals.13 Failure to apply
this rule would be contrary to judicial efficiency and conflict with ease
of administration—two of the core purposes of the class device.14 While
this Note assumes that BMS likely applies to named plaintiffs, cate–
gorizing absent class members as non-parties significantly diminishes
BMS’s effects on class actions. Under this approach, the out-of-state
status of an unnamed plaintiff would be irrelevant. As a result, all the
plaintiff class would need to do to satisfy personal jurisdiction would
be to file the action in a federal court in any state,15 a federal court in
9.

Wilf-Townsend, supra note 1, at 212–13.

10.

Id. at 208.

11.

Throughout the remainder of this Note, I will refer to this as the “nonparty approach” or “the non-party rule.”

12.

See Devlin v. Scardelleti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002). In Devlin, the Court
reasoned:
The rule that nonnamed class members cannot defeat complete
diversity is likewise justified by the goals of class litigation. Ease of
administration of class actions would be compromised by having to
consider the citizenship of all class members, many of whom may
even be unknown, in determining jurisdiction. Perhaps more
importantly, considering all class members for these purposes would
destroy diversity in almost all class actions. Nonnamed class
members are, therefore, not parties in that respect.
Id. (citation omitted).

13.

See Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Jones
v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 311 (N.D. Ala. 2018); see
also Mussat v. IQVIA Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 1126 (2021).

14.

Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 822.

15.

This is when the Fifth Amendment applies for personal jurisdiction. See
infra Part I.B.2.b.

1123

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
23 and Me

a state to which the named plaintiff has a connection, or a state where
the defendant is incorporated or has its principal place of business.16
Part I of this Note discusses modern personal-jurisdiction juris–
prudence and highlights recent developments in the law. Part II gives
an overview of BMS and a brief description of class actions, detailing
the certification process and describing a major difference between class
actions and mass tort actions. Part III introduces the non-party
approach and its application in other areas of class actions, and explains
why it should be extended to personal jurisdiction. Lastly, Part IV
responds to common arguments against applying the non-party rule to
personal jurisdiction in class actions.

I.

Personal Jurisdiction Today

The modern era of the personal-jurisdiction doctrine began in 1945
with the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.17 In
International Shoe, the Court abandoned the territorial sovereignty
theory to focus solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.18 In doing so, the Court developed the well-known
minimum contacts test used for specific jurisdiction today.19
Since International Shoe was decided in 1945, the personal
jurisdiction doctrine has gone through many changes. The two cases
that have attracted the most attention recently—BMS and Daimler AG
v. Bauman20—were decided by the Supreme Court in 2017 and 2014,
respectively. While Daimler concerned issues of general personal
jurisdiction and BMS addressed specific personal jurisdiction, both
cases narrowed the circumstances in which courts can exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendants. To best understand the current state of
both specific and general personal jurisdiction, it is best to analyze each
separately.

16.

These latter two are when the Fourteenth Amendment applies. See infra
Part I.B.2.a.

17.

326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due
Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 12 (2006) (describing International Shoe as “the
fountainhead of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine”).

18.

Parrish, supra note 17, at 12.

19.

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgement in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940))). See infra Part I.B.

20.

571 U.S. 117 (2014).
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A. General Personal Jurisdiction

General personal jurisdiction allows a court to hear “any and all
claims” against a foreign defendant regardless of whether those claims
arose from the defendant’s in-state activity.21 Prior to 2014, the general
personal jurisdiction analysis was primarily “contact-based.”22 The
theory was that if a defendant had “continuous and systematic
contacts” in the forum state, then general personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was warranted.23 In 2014, the Supreme Court threw a wrench
in the general personal jurisdiction framework in its decision in
Daimler.24 Now, for general personal jurisdiction to exist, the defendant
must be “at home” in the forum state, or in other words, the forum
state must be the defendant’s state of incorporation or where its
principal place of business is located.25
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

A court that lacks general personal jurisdiction may still have
specific personal jurisdiction over a party. Unlike general personal
jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction does not allow a court to hear any and
all claims against the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff’s claims must
arise out of the defendant’s in-forum activity.26
The specific personal jurisdiction analysis is a multi-step framework
that varies depending on whether a case is in state or federal court. The
first step of the analysis, however, is usually the same regardless of the
forum. That is, courts will determine whether the exercise of personal
21.

Foreign in this context refers to a defendant from either a different state or
foreign country. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (defining foreign as “sister-state or foreign country”).

22.

Id. (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations
to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State.” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).

23.

Id. at 922 (citation omitted).

24.

571 U.S. at 138–39.

25.

Id. at 137, 139.

26.

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). The Court
explained:
Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant who has not consented to suit there, [the] “fair
warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant has “purposefully
directed” his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation
results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those
activities.
Id. (footnote omitted) (first quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 774 (1984); and then quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
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jurisdiction in a case is authorized by the appropriate legislative body.27
If a court finds that personal jurisdiction was authorized, the court
must then determine “whether the exercise of jurisdiction ‘comports
with the limits imposed by . . . due process.’”28
1.

Authorization by the Appropriate Legislative Body

To determine whether Congress authorized the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in a particular instance, federal courts will look to either
the federal statute under which the claim arises or the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.29 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs personal jurisdiction in federal court.30 Under Rule 4(k), there
are several ways a federal court can establish jurisdiction over a
defendant. First, federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over defen–
dants who are subject to personal jurisdiction in the state in which the
federal court sits through service of process or the filing of a waiver of
service.31 If a case is in state court the state’s long-arm statute dictates
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate.32 Some
states have liberal long-arm statutes that confer jurisdiction to the full
extent authorized by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, California’s long-arm statute provides that
“[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States.”33 Other states may take a more restrictive approach, limiting
the scenarios where jurisdiction exists. New York is an example of a
state that has a long-arm statute that is more limited in scope.34

27.

If it is a federal question case in federal court, courts will look to the federal
statute under which the claim arises or more generally the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). If the case is in state
court, courts will look to the state’s long-arm statute. See Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) (looking first to Nevada’s statutory law to deter–
mine to what extent it authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants).

28.

Walden, 571 U.S. at 283 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125).

29.

See 4 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1069 (4th ed. 2019).

30.

See id.

31.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject
to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the
district court is located.”).

32.

See 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1069.

33.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 2019).

34.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2008). The statute provides:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in
this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-
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Another way for a federal court to establish personal jurisdiction
over a defendant is under Rule 4(k)(2), which provides that a federal
court has personal jurisdiction in a federal question case if “the
defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general
jurisdiction; and exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.”35
The last way for a federal court to establish jurisdiction over a
defendant is if the assertion of jurisdiction was authorized by Congress
in the statute giving rise to the cause of action.36 For example, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) authorizes
jurisdiction in “the district where the plan is administered, where the
breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found, and
process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides
or may be found.”37
2.

Due Process Standards

Legislative authorization to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
particular defendant alone is insufficient. The exercise of jurisdiction
must also comport with constitutional due-process requirements. The
due-process standard that applies differs depending on the case. The

domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or
through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to
supply goods or services in the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person
or property within the state, except as to a cause of action for
defamation of character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have
consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.
Id.
35.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).

36.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of
service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . when author–
ized by a federal statute.”).

37.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012).
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key determination is whether the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment
governs.
a.

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment controls
the personal jurisdiction analysis when: (1) the case is in state court;
(2) the case is heard by a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction
applying state law; or (3) the federal statute under which the claim is
brought does not authorize personal jurisdiction.38
Minimum Contacts, Purposeful Availment, and Connection

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, for a court to exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant first must have
“contacts, ties, or relations” in the forum.39 This is often referred to as
the minimum-contacts requirement.40 Predicting whether a defendant
has sufficient contact with a forum to satisfy this test can be difficult,
as the Supreme Court itself has struggled to give a clear answer as to
exactly what constitutes minimum contacts.41 Ultimately, the inquiry
is highly fact-specific and will vary from case to case.
The presence of minimum contacts alone, however, is not sufficient
to support personal jurisdiction. The defendant must also have
purposefully availed itself to the forum—a requirement which is said to
“ensure[] that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as
a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or of the
‘unilateral activity of another party or third person.’”42 Purposeful
availment occurs when a defendant has “deliberately . . . engaged in
significant activities within a State, or has created ‘continuing
obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum.”43

38.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k). See also 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, §
1064.

39.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).

40.

See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“Once
it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum
contacts . . . .”) (emphasis added).

41.

See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 227–28 (1977) (Brennan, J,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority’s
approach to a minimum-contacts analysis).

42.

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (first quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc.,
465 U.S. 770, 773–74 (1984); then quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1979); and then quoting Helicopters
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)).

43.

Id. at 475–76 (first quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781; and then quoting
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950)).
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Lastly, the claims brought against a defendant must also arise from
the defendant’s contacts within the state. In other words, there has to
be a connection between the forum and underlying legal controversy
that establishes jurisdiction.44 In BMS, the Court made it clear that this
requirement could not be relaxed just because a defendant has extensive
contacts within a state.45 Despite maintaining widespread business
operations in the state, the out-of-state plaintiffs could not show a
connection between their claims, the state, and Bristol Myers Squibb,
and therefore the Court held that there was no jurisdiction.46
Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice

If a defendant is found to have purposefully established minimum
contacts within a state and the plaintiff’s claims arise out of those
contacts, courts then consider a number of other factors to decide
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”47 These factors include the
“burden on the defendant[;] . . . the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief[;] . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.”48
b. Fifth Amendment Due Process Personal
Jurisdiction Standards

The Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth, controls the
personal jurisdiction analysis in federal question cases in which: (1) the
defendant is out of reach of any state’s long-arm statute; or (2) the
federal statute under which the claim arises authorizes personal
jurisdiction and nationwide service of process.49 In the absence of either,
even if a case is in federal court, the Fourteenth Amendment applies.50

44.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).

45.

Id. at 1781 (rejecting a sliding-scale approach).

46.

Id. at 1779, 1781.

47.

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Miliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

48.

World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations
omitted).

49.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)–(2); 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29,
§ 1068.1.

50.

4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(1)(A) (making personal jurisdiction dependent on whether a state
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What limitations the Fifth Amendment places on the ability of federal
courts to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question that
the Court left open in BMS51 and did not address on two other
occasions.52 While lower courts have addressed the issue, they have
reached varying conclusions as to what the Fifth Amendment personaljurisdiction framework looks like.53
In federal question cases, the Fifth Amendment personaljurisdiction inquiry changes to a national-contacts test.54 For a federal
court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant under the nationalcontacts test, the defendant must have minimum contacts in the United
States.55 This analysis is similar to the requirements imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the key difference being that the scope is na–
tional rather than confined to the borders of an individual state.56 One
unclear part of the Fifth Amendment personal-jurisdiction standard is
what weight should be given to the fairness factors, if any.57 The fairness
test incorporates notions from the Fourteenth Amendment iterated in
International Shoe58, and allows the exercize of jurisdiction when:

court of general jurisdiction could exercise jurisdiction under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
51.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017)
(“[W]e leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the
same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal
court.”).

52.

See Omni Cap. Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987)
(acknowledging the unsettled Fifth Amendment argument); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co., v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (“We have no
occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction over . . . defendants based on the aggregate of national
contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State
in which the federal court sits.”).

53.

Compare Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 275 (4th Cir.
2005) (finding sufficient contacts constitutionally necessary for the exercise
of a court’s jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2)), with Bally Gaming, Inc. v.
Kappos, 789 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[W]hen this Court derives
its personal jurisdiction over a defendant from a federal statute’s nation–
wide-service-of-process provision, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not require that the defendant also have minimum
contacts with this district.”).

54.

4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–19; see also 4 Wright
& Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1.
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The combination of the federal interest in furthering fundamental
social policies, the judicial system’s interest in the efficient
resolution of controversies, the particular forum’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief outweigh the burden on the
defendant.59

For federal courts that use the fairness approach, personal
jurisdiction will be upheld if the defendant has both minimum contacts
in the United States and if doing so is consistent with traditional
notions of “fair play and substantial justice.”60 For courts that do not
incorporate the fairness approach under the Fifth Amendment, the
personal-jurisdiction framework can be understood as due process
allowing the assertion of jurisdiction so long as “the federal interest in
furthering fundamental objectives or policies rises to a constitutional
level.”61

II. Overview of Bristol-Myers Squibb and
Rule 23 Class Actions
A. Bristol-Myers Squibb: The Beginning of a New Limitation

BMS was a mass-tort action brought in a California state court
based on a products-liability claim.62 The plaintiffs alleged that BMS’s
drug Plavix adversely affected their health.63 Most of the 678 plaintiffs
were not residents of California.64And while BMS had extensive business
operations in the state, the out-of-state plaintiffs did not ingest or
purchase Plavix in California and therefore had no connection to the
state.65 The Court’s analysis in part focused on the burden placed on
the defendant if forced to litigate the case in California.66 According to
the Court, determining the burden on a defendant under the personaljurisdiction analysis is just as much about “territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States” as it is not wanting to subject a
defendant to “inconvenient or distant litigation.”67

59.

4 Wright & Miller, supra note 29, § 1068.1.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 1781.

66.

Id. at 1780.

67.

Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
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In reaching its holding, the Court rejected what it referred to as a
“sliding scale” approach used by the California Supreme Court.68 The
California Supreme Court opined that the greater the defendant’s
contacts in the state, the less need there was for a strong connection
between the claims and the forum state.69 BMS employed over 400
people, maintained six research, development and policymaking
facilities, and enjoyed $1 billion in sales in California.70 Nevertheless,
the Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction.71 The dispositive
fact was the lack of connection between the nonresident plaintiffs’
claims and the forum.72
It did not take long for the effects of BMS to trickle down to the
lower courts. Hours after BMS was decided, a judge in St. Louis,
Missouri, granted a mistrial in a wrongful death suit against Johnson
& Johnson.73 The underlying claim was that Johnson & Johnson’s
talcum powder caused ovarian cancer, which allegedly led to the deaths
of all three plaintiffs.74 At trial, the plaintiffs were awarded $72 and $55
million.75 But just after BMS was decided, Johnson & Johnson moved
for a mistrial, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs’ claims because two of the three plaintiffs were from out of
state and did not use or purchase the talcum powder in Missouri.76 The
plaintiffs argued that Johnson & Johnson sold the product in the state,
so their claim related to the defendant’s contact in the forum.77 Because
of BMS, however, the judge ruled in favor of Johnson & Johnson.78
While the Johnson & Johnson case is a prime example of BMS’s effects
68.

Id. at 1781.

69.

Id. at 1778.

70.

Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

71.

Id. at 1783 (majority opinion).

72.

Id. at 1781 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained,
and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same
injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”).

73.

Richard Levick, The Game Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb the End of
an Era?, Forbes (Jul. 11, 2017, 02:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/richardlevick/2017/07/11/the-game-changes-is-bristol-myers-squibb
-the-end-of-an-era/#18fabed32e83 [https://perma.cc/VRV7-MLJG].

74.

Jane Akre, J&J Granted Mistrial in Latest Talc Case in MO.,
MeshNewsDesk (July 19, 2017), https://www.meshmedicaldevicenews
desk.com/articles/jj-granted-mistrial-latest-talc-case-mo [https://perma.cc
/4J9M-QLJT].

75.

Id.

76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.
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on forms of joined representation that are very similar to mass actions,
the question left open after BMS is in what other contexts outside of
mass-tort actions does its holding apply.
B. Rule 23 Class Actions

The class-action device serves an important role in our legal system.
The rationale for having such a form of legal representation is to
efficiently resolve the claims of several individuals in a single action.79
The idea is that by consolidating claims into a single action, courts can
avoid repetitive litigation, inconsistent outcomes on claims based on
related events, and provide relief for individuals who could not vindicate
their rights in individual law suits.80 Before a case can move forward as
a class action, the party seeking class treatment must file for class
certification.81
1.

Four Types of Class Actions

There are four different forms of classes under Rule 23.82 First, Rule
23(b)(1)(A) classes are warranted when the adjudication of individual
cases would result in “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect
to individual class members that would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.”83 The purpose
of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is to shield the party opposing the class from
inconsistent judgments.84
Second, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) classes are appropriate when the adjud–
ication of individual cases would potentially result in “adjudications
with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter,
would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties
to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests.”85 The text of the rule makes
clear that the purpose of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is to protect the members of
the class.86

79.

7A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1754 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2020).

80.

Id.

81.

Libby Jelinek, The Applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence at Class
Certification, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 280, 282 (2018).

82.

Robert H. Klonoff, The Adoption of a Class Action Rule: Some Issues for
Mississippi to Consider, 24 Miss. Coll. L. Rev. 261, 263 (2005).

83.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

84.

Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

85.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

86.

Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

1133

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
23 and Me

Third, a Rule 23(b)(2) class is proper when the “party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”87 Rule 23(b)(2) classes
are often used in civil rights cases and “other suits seeking primarily
structural relief.”88
Lastly, a Rule 23(b)(3) class is fitting in two situations. First, when
“the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members,” and second, when the court determines that “a class action
is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.”89
Regardless of what type of class is appropriate under 23(b), the
party seeking class status must first satisfy all the requirements in Rule
23(a). Rule 23(a) states that there must be: (1) numerosity; (2) com–
monality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy.90 Numerosity requires that
the plaintiff prove the class size is so large that joinder of all members
would be impracticable.91 To prove commonality, plaintiffs must show
that members’ claims include “questions of law or fact common to the
class.”92 Typicality requires the plaintiff(s) to show that “the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class.”93 And adequacy requires the plaintiff(s) to
demonstrate that the “representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.”94 If the proposed class can survive
23(a), it must then fulfill the conditions of one of the three subcategories
of 23(b).95
2.

Named and Unnamed Plaintiffs: Class Actions Distinguished
from Mass Actions

BMS began as eight separate actions that were eventually
consolidated into a mass action tort lawsuit under section 404 of the

87.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

88.

Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

89.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also Klonoff, supra note 82, at 263.

90.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

91.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.
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California Civil Procedure Code.96 In a section 404 mass action, there
are no “absentee litigants,” or in other words, every plaintiff in the case
is a named party.97 The effect of this is that “each joined plaintiff may
make different claims requiring different responses.”98 Unlike mass
actions, in class actions there are two categories of plaintiffs: the
representatives of the class (named plaintiffs), and the absent class
members (unnamed plaintiffs).99 Because of Rule 23(a)’s requirements,
after certification, the defendant is presented with a “unitary, coherent
claim to which it need respond only with a unitary, coherent defense.”100
In several of the cases addressing the application of BMS to class
actions, courts have focused on the distinction between the two, and
rightfully so.101

III. The Non-Party Approach
At the time this Note is being written, the issue of whether BMS
applies to class actions has come before two circuit courts of appeals.
First, in Mussat v. IQVIA, the Seventh Circuit unanimously held that
BMS does not apply to unnamed plaintiffs in class actions.102 That court
took a similar position to the one argued in this Note—that unnamed
class members should not be considered parties for personal-jurisdiction
purposes.103 The court explained that considering only named plaintiffs
for personal jurisdiction has always been the approach, and there is
nothing to indicate that BMS changed anything with regard to class
actions.104 The Supreme Court, in several cases involving nationwide
class actions where the basis for personal jurisdiction was specific
personal jurisdiction, did not raise a jurisdictional issue with regard to

96.

Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 1126 (2021).

97.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 404 (West 2019).

98.

Knotts v. Nissan N. Am. Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1334 (D. Minn. 2018)

99.

1 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 1:5 (5th ed.
2020).

100. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360,
1366 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
101. See id.; Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2018);
Jones v. Depuy Synthes Prods., Inc., 330 F.R.D. 298, 311 (N.D. Ala.
2018).
102. 953 F.3d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 2020).
103. Id. at 447.
104. Id. at 445.
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the unnamed class members’ claims.105 The Seventh Circuit also
reasoned that it would be illogical to take a non-party approach for
subject matter jurisdiction and venue in class actions, but not personal
jurisdiction.106
Meanwhile, in Molock v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., the D.C.
Circuit declined to address whether BMS applied to class actions in
federal court.107 Instead, the court held that because the class was not
yet certified, a ruling on the merits of the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the nonresident putative class members’ claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction was premature because putative class members were not
parties before the court.108 A dissenting judge concluded that BMS
applies to class actions in federal court.109 The dissenter rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that absent class members are not parties for the
purposes of personal jurisdiction.110 He reasoned that for purposes of
personal jurisdiction, “the party status of absent class members seems
to . . . be irrelevant,” because “[a] court that adjudicates claims
asserted on behalf of others in a class action exercises coercive power
over a defendant just as much as when it adjudicates claims of named
plaintiffs in a mass action.”111
A. Judicial Affirmance of the Non-Party Rule in other
Class Action Contexts

The notion that unnamed plaintiffs in certified class actions are
parties to a litigation for some purposes and not others is by no means
novel.112 In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the issue before
the Court was whether unnamed plaintiffs were considered parties for
the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations.113 Although the Court
concluded that unnamed plaintiffs were parties for statute-of-limitation
purposes, it did so because it said to rule otherwise would require every
absent class member to intervene and preserve their claims and such a
requirement would be inconsistent with Rule 23.114
105. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); and Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979)).
106. Id. at 447.
107. 952 F.3d 293, 306–07 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
108. Id. at 295.
109. Id. at 306 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 307.
112. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551 (1974).
113. Id. at 540.
114. Id. at 550.
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Likewise, in Devlin v. Scardelletti, the Court reaffirmed that un–
named class members may be considered parties for some purposes and
not for others and that the determination was context-specific and
“justified by the goals of class action litigation.”115 The Court stated
that unnamed plaintiffs are not considered parties with regard to
diversity of citizenship because such a requirement would require courts
to consider the citizenship of every class member, thereby defeating one
of the main goals of class actions—“[e]ase of administration.”116 The
Court also noted that considering the citizenship for all class members
“would destroy diversity in almost all class actions” and render Rule 23
unworkable.117
Lower courts have also recognized that unnamed plaintiffs in class
actions may be parties for certain purposes and not for others. For
example, in Neale v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, the Third
Circuit held that unnamed plaintiffs in class actions are not parties for
Article III standing purposes.118 The court explained that class actions
are a representative form of litigation and that the named plaintiffs are
the parties seeking to invoke the court’s jurisdiction and are responsible
for establishing jurisdiction.119 Additionally, in Appleton Electric Co. v.
Advance-United Expressways, the Seventh Circuit held that absent
class members are not required to establish venue because imposing
such a requirement “would eliminate the use of the class-action route
in all cases where a defendant class is appropriate.”120
B. The Non-Party Rule Applied to Personal Jurisdiction: Judicial
Efficiency and Ease of Administration

Class actions serve as an “efficient and fair” way to solve legal
claims once, rather than multiple times, avoiding “piecemeal liti–
gation.”121 It is also widely agreed that federal courts have an interest
in discouraging repetitive litigation “not only within a single district
but within the entire system.”122 Requiring every unnamed class
115. 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 794 F.3d 353, 367 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Quite simply, requiring Article III
standing of absent class members is inconsistent with the nature of an action
under Rule 23.”).
119. Id. at 364.
120. 494 F.2d 126, 140 (7th Cir. 1974) (quoting Rsch. Corp. v. Pfister Assoc.
Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).
121. Chicago Tchrs. Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 797 F.3d
426, 444 (7th Cir. 2015).
122. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980).

1137

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
23 and Me

member to be from the state, or have suffered an injury in the state,
would destroy jurisdiction in almost all cases. This would essentially be
the end of the class-action device, the inevitable result of which would
be an increase in piecemeal litigation to resolve legal claims based on
the same underlying issue.
Similar to subject matter jurisdiction, forcing unnamed plaintiffs in
class actions to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction would
also be inconsistent with another major policy justification behind
Rule 23—ease of administration.123 If the non-party rule were rejected,
courts would have to consider each individual class member’s
connection to the forum in order to properly conduct the personaljurisdiction analysis.124 Such a task would be just as burdensome and
inefficient as examining citizenship of each absent class member to
determine whether complete diversity exists, an approach that the
Supreme Court rejected in Devlin.125

IV. Common Counterarguments to the
Non-Party Approach
The non-party approach to personal jurisdiction in class actions has
received some pushback from courts and legal commentators. The
compilation of defenses below was gathered from articles, judicial
opinions, and briefs filed in cases involving the application of BMS to
class actions.
A. What about Defendant’s Due Process Rights?

The dissenting opinion in Molock stated that “[a] defendant is . . .
entitled to due process protections—including limits on assertions of
personal jurisdiction—with respect to all claims in a class action for
which a judgment is sought.”126 Of course, defendants are not stripped
of due process rights in a class action, including protection from overly
broad assertions of personal jurisdiction. But once a class is certified,
there are no longer any individual class-member claims. Certification
means that “key elements of the claim, and the key defenses, are
common to the class,”127 and as a result the defendant is presented with
123. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002).
124. This pertains to cases where the Fourteenth, rather than the Fifth,
Amendment applies.
125. Devlin, 536 U.S. at 10.
126. Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(Silberman, J., dissenting).
127. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellant and Reversal at 17, Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-1204), 2019 WL 1422419.
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a “unitary, coherent claim to which it need respond only with a unitary,
coherent defense.”128 Under the non-party approach, the defendant can
still challenge the exercize of personal jurisdiction with respect to the
plaintiffs who are bringing that unitary claim, i.e., the named plaintiffs.
This ensures that there is sufficient connection to the forum for the
claim being brought and therefore the defendant’s due process rights
are protected. This approach is consistent with other forms of litigation
in which representatives of others sue in their own names.129 For
example, in suits involving trustees, executors, or guardians, a court
will examine personal jurisdiction with regard to the representative, not
the person being represented.130 Therefore, requiring a rule where every
absent class member must be examined for personal jurisdiction would
be as “pointless as it is radical” because the defendant’s due process
rights are already adequately protected in a class action by other class
device features.131
When a defendant’s due process rights are already protected by
other requirements set forth in Rule 23, courts have been hesitant to
create new rules. For example, in Mullins v. Direct Digital LLC, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the application of a heightened “ascer–
tainability” requirement in class actions.132 The defendants in Mullins
argued that such a requirement would allow defendants in class action
to “challenge the reliability of evidence submitted to prove class
membership,” a step necessary to protect a defendant’s due process
rights.133 The court disagreed, holding that a defendant’s due process
rights are already protected by a “careful and balanced” application of
Rule 23.134
B. Rule 4(k)(1)(A)

The defendants in Mussat argued that allowing the unnamed
plaintiffs’ claims to go forward would be inconsistent with Rule
128. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360,
1366 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
129. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 448.
130. Id.
131. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice, supra note 127,
at 16, 17 (“To be certified as a class action under Rule 23 . . . a ‘suit must
satisfy due process procedural safeguards that do not exist in mass tort
actions.’ These include Rule 23’s requirements of ‘numerosity, commonality,
typicality, adequacy of representation, predominance and superiority.’”
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 3d 1310, 1333 (D. Minn. 2018))).
132. 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015).
133. Id. at 669.
134. Id. at 672.
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4(k)(1)(A).135 That rule provides that “[s]erving a summons or filing a
waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who
is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state where the district court is located.”136 The argument is that
because out-of-state unnamed class members could not bring their
claims in a court of general jurisdiction in the state, they may not do
so in federal court.137 As Mussat properly noted, and as described
above,138 Rule 4(k)(1)(A) does allow federal courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendants in some cases.139 But that is not to say that
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) limits the jurisdiction of federal courts in every case.
There are other scenarios under Rule 4 in which a federal court may
have jurisdiction even if a state court of general jurisdiction where the
federal court is located does not.140 Even assuming that Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
limits the jurisdiction of federal courts in every case, a federal court
would still not need personal jurisdiction over an absent class member
under the non-party rule because they are not parties to the litigation.141
C. The Rules Enabling Act

Another common objection to the non-party approach is that it
violates the Rules Enabling Act.142 The Rules Enabling Act provides
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot “abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”143 The argument is that if unnamed
plaintiffs are not parties, defendants cannot challenge their claims for
lack of personal jurisdiction—claims for which they may be liable—
therefore depriving the defendant of a substantive right.144 The first
issue with this defense is that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 and 23
do not violate the Rules Enabling Act.

135. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 447.
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
137. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 445.
138. See supra pp. 1129–33.
139. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 448 (“It is true that, with certain exceptions, a federal
district court has personal jurisdiction only over a party who would be
subject to the jurisdiction of the state court where the federal district court
is located.”).
140. See supra pp. 1129–33.
141. See, e.g., Mussat, 953 F.3d at 447.
142. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees, Urging Affirmance at 22, Mussat, 953 F.3d 441 (No. 19-1204),
2019 WL 1883613.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
144. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 142, at 22–24.
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In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance
Co., the Supreme Court interpreted the Rules Enabling Act as a
limitation [that] means that the Rule must “really regulat[e]
procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.” The test
is not whether the Rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights;
most procedural rules do. What matters is what the Rule itself
regulates: If it governs only “the manner and the means” by which
the litigants’ rights are “enforced,” it is valid; if it alters “the rules
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it
is not.145

The Court went on to state that, like Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 18, 20, and 42(a), Rule 23 is procedural because it “merely
enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at
once . . . . And like traditional joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights
and duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.”146 Like Rule 23,
personal jurisdiction in federal courts is also procedural and “a proper
subject of rulemaking.”147 Rule 4 addresses when a federal court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and it only addresses
the methods and manner by which a federal court may do so. Therefore,
because both Rule 23 and Rule 4 are purely procedural rules under the
Shady Grove test, they do not violate the Rules Enabling Act.
D. Federal Rule 82

Another commonly asserted defense is that the non-party approach
violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82.148 Rule 82 provides that
“[t]hese rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts
or the venue of actions in those courts.”149 The argument is that by
classifying unnamed plaintiffs as non-parties, Rule 23 creates personal
jurisdiction in situations where it otherwise would not exist and thus

145. 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) (citations omitted) (first quoting Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941); then quoting Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946); and then quoting id. at 446).
146. Id. at 408.
147. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Florence Mussat, M.D., S.C. at 24,
Mussat, 953 F.3d 441 (No. 19-1204), 2019 WL 2090500.
148. Bexis, The Latest on Personal Jurisdiction and Class Actions, Drug &
Device Law (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/
2019/10/the-latest-on-personal-jurisdiction-and-class-actions.html [https://
perma.cc/6VE5-9K6N].
149. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.
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expands jurisdiction.150 For example, if absent class member X could
not sue defendant Y in federal court in an individual suit, a case
proceeding through Rule 23 cannot create personal jurisdiction because
Rule 82 forbids it, or so the argument goes.151 But this argument falls
short because Rule 82 was not intended to apply to personal
jurisdiction. The use of the word “jurisdiction” in Rule 82 refers only
to subject matter jurisdiction.152 This is especially apparent when
examining the Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 82, which mention
that if the rule included “personal or quasi-in rem jurisdiction” it would
be a “flat lie.”153 Additionally, defining “jurisdiction” in Rule 82
narrowly to mean subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rule.154
Lastly, this argument assumes that federal courts lack personal
jurisdiction over claims by out-of-state plaintiffs in the first place. If
there is a case before a federal court in which the Fifth Amendment
applies for personal jurisdiction, the out-of-forum status of a plaintiff is
irrelevant because the proper inquiry involves nationwide, not in-state,
contacts, and therefore the defendant would be subject to the
jurisdiction of any federal court, regardless of the state in which it
sits.155 While an exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state plaintiff’s
claims seems like an expansion if a court can do so only pursuant to
Rule 4(k)(1)(A), again, under the non-party approach, federal courts
do not need jurisdiction over absent class members at all because they
are not parties.156
E. Abusive Forum Shopping and Principles of Federalism

In its amicus brief in Mussat, the United States Chamber of
Commerce argued that the non-party rule would promote “abusive

150. Bexis, supra note 148.
151. Id.
152. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 advisory committee’s notes; Corrected Brief of
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34, Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d
293 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 18-7162), 2019 WL 1469051.
153. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 advisory committee’s notes.
154. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“[R]ules
shall not be construed to extend . . . the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
United States district courts.”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 82); see also
Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (“Rule 82
must be construed . . . as referring to venue and jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the district courts . . . .”).
155. See supra pp. 1129–33.
156. Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441, 447 (7th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 1126 (2021).
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forum shopping” and “violate[] basic principles of federalism.”157 The
federalism argument is that lawsuits would be allowed to go forward in
forums that have no legitimate interest in the outcome of a case because
one named plaintiff with a connection to the forum could represent
thousands of class members who have no connection whatsoever.158 As
support, the Chamber cited Braver v. Northstar Alarm Services,
L.L.C., in which a federal district court rejected the application of BMS
to a class action in Oklahoma.159 In Braver, a single Oklahoma resident
was the named plaintiff representing a class of 239,630 people from all
across the country.160 The Chamber argued that even if the “class
members [were] proportionally distributed across the country, then
almost 99% of the claims have no connection to the forum.”161
First, this argument assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies for personal jurisdiction in all cases in federal court. This is a
necessary, and incorrect, assumption because if there is a case in federal
court where the Fifth Amendment controls the personal jurisdiction
analysis, the connection needed is to the nation, not a particular state.162
Second, even assuming the Fourteenth Amendment does apply for
personal jurisdiction purposes, the case is still in federal court, and
therefore the federalism concerns that supported the Court’s decision
in BMS are not present.163 Surely a federal court has an interest in the
adjudication of controversies properly before it under diversity or
federal question jurisdiction.

157. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 34, Mussat, 953 F.3d 441 (No. 19-1204),
2019 WL 1883614.
158. Id. at 31–32.
159. 329 F.R.D. 320, 326 (W.D. Okla. 2018).
160. Id.
161. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, supra note 157, at
34.
162. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
163. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360,
1367 (N.D. Ga. 2018). The court explained:
In this case, federalism concerns do not apply. Bristol-Myers is
about limiting a state court’s jurisdiction when it tried to reach outof-state defendants on behalf of out-of-state plaintiffs in a mass
action suit. That scenario is inapplicable to nationwide class actions
in federal court . . . . [A] nationwide class action in federal court is
not about a state’s overreaching, but rather relates to the judicial
system’s handling of mass claims involving numerous . . . parties.
Id. (quoting Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL
5971622, at *20 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017)).
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Under the non-party rule, the lawyers representing the plaintiff
class would simply need to file the lawsuit in the state where the named
representative resides or where they were injured to satisfy personal
jurisdiction requirements (or a state where their injury had some
connection to the forum). This type of forum shopping is no different
than the forum shopping the Supreme Court permitted in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc.164 In Keeton, the Court allowed a libel claim
against a nationwide magazine distributor in a forum state selected
because of its “unusually long statute of limitations.”165 The Court
permitted this type of forum shopping, referring to it as “no different
from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with
favorable substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local popu–
lations.”166
F. The Supreme Court Has Already Rejected the
Non-Party Rule in Shutts

Some have argued that the Supreme Court has already rejected the
non-party approach to personal jurisdiction in class actions.167 This
argument invokes Phillips Petroleum Co v. Shutts.168 In Shutts, one of
many issues before the Court was whether a state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over the claims of unnamed plaintiffs in class actions, even
though those plaintiffs do not possess the minimum contacts within the
forum normally required for personal jurisdiction to exist.169 The class
consisted of 28,000 members, 97% of whom had no connection to
Kansas, the state in which the action was brought.170 The Court ulti–
mately held that it had personal jurisdiction over unnamed plaintiffs’
claims despite the absence of minimum contacts.171
Opponents of the non-party theory construe Shutts to stand for the
notion that unnamed plaintiffs must be parties for the purpose of
personal jurisdiction because the Court stated that unnamed plaintiffs
were “entitled to some protection from the jurisdiction of a forum State
164. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
165. See id. at 773–75. See also Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harv.
L. Rev. 1677, 1682 (1990).
166. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779.
167. See, e.g., J. Gordon Cooney, Brian Ercole, Ezra Church & Jospeh Fay,
Applying BMS to Federal Class Actions: Due Process Matters, Law 360
(Jan. 12, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/
publication/outside-publication/article/2018/applying-bms-to-federal-class
-actions-12jan18.ashx [https://perma.cc/2UNR-9ZLF].
168. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
169. Id. at 811.
170. Id. at 801, 815.
171. Id. at 811.
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which seeks to adjudicate their claims.”172 The problem with this
argument is that the Shutts Court focused primarily on the due process
rights of the unnamed plaintiffs, not the defendants.173 As the Court
explained, the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state
plaintiffs is different from its power to exercise jurisdiction over out-ofstate defendants.174 In BMS, the Court already rejected the application
of Shutts, stating that it has no application with regard to the due
process rights of defendants.175 Therefore, the reliance on Shutts to
determine the party status of unnamed plaintiffs to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant is misplaced.

Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Shady Grove managed to slip under the
media’s radar for the most part.176 While excusable because the case
involved a complex procedural issue, the impact the case had on class
actions deserved far more attention than it received.177 The Court
essentially saved the federal class action from destruction by holding
that Rule 23 preempts state class-action statutes in federal diversity
cases.178 Had the Court ruled differently, the class-action device would
have been severely undermined if not completely crushed.179 We are at
a similar crossroad currently. If BMS were to extend to unnamed
plaintiffs in class actions, the effect would be catastrophic. The nonparty approach offers a simple and sensible solution: Absent class
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 808–09. The Court wrote:
The burdens placed by a State upon an absent class-action plaintiff
are not of the same order or magnitude as those it places upon an
absent defendant. . . .
....
In sharp contrast to the predicament of a defendant haled into an
out-of-state forum, the plaintiffs in this suit were not haled
anywhere to defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment.
Id. at 808.
175. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017)
(“Since Shutts concerned the due process rights of plaintiffs, it has no
bearing on the question presented here.”).
176. Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A Near-Death Experience in a
Shady Grove, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 448, 448 (2011).
177. Id. at 448–49.
178. Id. at 448.
179. Id. at 449.
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members are not parties for personal jurisdiction purposes and therefore
out-of-state status is irrelevant. By adopting this rule, BMS’s impact
on class actions would be greatly diminished. While it is true that BMS
still likely applies to the named plaintiffs in class actions, the attorneys
representing the plaintiff class can easily navigate around this by filing
in a federal court where the named representative was injured or
affected.
There already exist too many barriers preventing claimants,
especially the indigent, from vindicating their rights in court.180 If BMS
is held to apply to class actions, the uphill battle plaintiffs face in
bringing claims against corporations would become even steeper. Now
that federal appellate courts have begun to hear cases involving the
issue,181 the Supreme Court will presumably have an opportunity to
weigh in. Until then, even with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in favor of
the non-party rule,182 BMS at the very least will continue to make
attorneys think twice about where they should file class actions for the
foreseeable future.183
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